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3.1  Introduction 
The agricultural policies currently in place in the United States and 
the European Community are similar in one respect: both are designed 
to increase the export market share without  regard  to the prices  or 
revenues these products earn. A price war is currently being waged 
between the two trading communities in which, as with any price war, 
there is a welfare transfer from the combatants to the consumer (in 
this case, food-importing  countries). The wealth  transfers are enor- 
mous. When the 1985 Farm Bill takes effect in the United States, both 
areas will be exporting food at well below the cost of production.’ This 
avoidable situation is the result of a misguided attempt by the European 
Community (EC) to increase the income of  its agricultural producers, 
followed by a somewhat more  justifiable attempt by the U.S. to  counter 
the policies of the EC. It is a situation that, if  unchecked, will cause 
most of  the finances allocated  for agricultural income support to be 
used eventually as a food subsidy for the industrial competitors of both 
communities. 
Using a rather broad definition  of a “farmer,”  there are approxi- 
mately 6 million farmers in the EC-I0 and 2 million in the U.S. “Roughly 
speaking, in  1983 the governments of  the United  States and the Eu- 
ropean Community had farm policies that cost the taxpayers and con- 
sumers a minimum of $80 billion” (Johnson 1984), or  $lO,OOO  per farmer. 
This figure approximately equaled the average net farm income in the 
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U.S. in that year (Petit 1985) and was well above that which prevailed 
in the EC. It will become clear later in this paper that this cost to benefit 
ratio has deteriorated since then, Moreover, despite this enormous 
wealth  transfer,  farmers  are  in  poor  financial  condition  in  both 
communities. 
We begin our discussion in section 3.2 with an analysis  of the common 
agricultural policy (CAP) of the EC. We  argue that the CAP’S pricing 
mechanism has acted as an incentive for individuals to overproduce, 
while the institutional design of the EC has caused national govern- 
ments to encourage such overproduction. We  then discuss how the 
technologies  that have evolved in  response to these incentives have 
shifted the supply curve  for individual commodities  to  the right, making 
a reduction to the new equilibrium price level politically infeasible. We 
show that in the long run the effect of these above-equilibrium prices 
will  necessitate an ever increasing reliance  on export subsidies. We 
then review the performance of the CAP in achieving the objectives of 
an efficient use of resources, stabilized markets, and fairness. Unsur- 
prisingly the single policy instrument of the CAP (price fixing) has not 
achieved its multiple objectives. 
In section 3.3 we discuss U.S. agricultural policy as it relates to US- 
EC trade relations. Particular attention is  paid to the Food  Security 
Act of  1985, which we view as the U.S. response to the excesses of 
the CAP. The long-run implications of this policy are surprisingly similar 
to those of the CAP, a fact which allowed us to  avoid a tedious repetition 
of the theoretical analysis. 
In section 3.4 we discuss developments in this price war as they 
relate to international comparative advantage. This is followed by a 
discussion of the direction in which the US-EC dispute is heading. 
We conclude in section 3.5 with a proposal to ease the current ten- 
sions. It consists of a specific set of policy changes which were designed 
to be politically feasible yet welfare enhancing. Although this policy 
alternative was designed with specific reference to CAP reform, it would 
achieve maximum benefit  if  used as the basis for a bilateral  policy 
alignment. 
3.2  The CAP 
3.2.1  European Behavior under the CAP 
The long-term trend in  the increase in  the volume  of agricultural 
production in the Community has been 1.5 percent to 2 percent per 
year,  although internal  demand has increased by only 0.5  percent 
per year. This spectacular surge in agricultural production in Europe 
will continue and could well gather momentum in coming years (Com- 
mission of the European Community 1985a). 69  US-EC Agricultural  Policies 
The European Community is already the largest exporter of meat 
and dairy products in the world. It has been a net exporter of wheat 
since 1974 and has recently become a net exporter of coarse grains 
(Meilke and de Gorter 1985). 
While the EC-10 remains a major importer of oilseeds, production 
of sunflower seeds in the 1985-86  crop year is expected to be more 
than 300 percent above the 1979-84  average. For rapeseed the increase 
is 167 percent (U.S. Department of Agriculture 1986). U.S. exports of 
soybeans to Europe have fallen 25 percent since 1983 (Rosson 1985). 
If  quotas are imposed on cereal output, it seems inevitable that this 
trend towards self-sufficiency in oilseeds will continue. 
Exports of European wines to the U.S. have recently been the subject 
of GATT litigation because of countervailing duty action by the United 
States (see chapter 2). Furthermore, when asked if  he felt the U.S. 
Wine Equity Act (a measure that permits import retaliation and export 
subsidies if other countries do  not reduce their import barriers on wine) 
could lead to a trade war, Mr. Bruno Julian, the Community’s agri- 
cultural  representative said, “We  would  certainly move against the 
import trade in soybean and soybean meal”  (Wines  and  Vines,  March 
1984). 
There seems to be no end in sight to this increase in EC agricultural 
production. The Commission has estimated using current trends that 
by 1991 cereal “stocks will amount to around 80 million tons which is 
almost half the Community production and more than three times the 
quantity which the Community was able to sell on the world market 
when conditions were most favorable” (Commission of the European 
Community 1985~).  To  put this figure in perspective, for the period 
1978-82  the U.S. produced on average 64 million metric tons of wheat 
per year, while total world wheat exports, including intra-EC trade, 
were 89.7 million metric tons. Between 1975 and 1984 the U.S. share 
of the world’s grain trade has declined from 53 percent to 43 percent. 
In March 1985 Mr. Julian stated that “the EC believes it is entitled to 
a fair share of the world market and it will be aggressive in trying to 
obtain this share” (Rosson 1985). 
In figure 3.1 the value of import levies collected by the EC is ex- 
pressed as a percentage of expenditures on export refunds. The ab- 
solute values of these numbers are presented in table 3.1. To dispose 
of surplus production the Community has increasingly depended on 
export refunds, which  are, in  effect, a  food subsidy for importing 
countries. 
It is widely felt that U.S. farmers are more efficient than their Eu- 
ropean counterparts (Petit  1985). The question then arises as to the 
source of the increase in EC exports. In table 3.2 the relative rates of 
protection in the EC, Japan, and the United  States are presented. It 
can be seen that this increase in exports was not in response to world 70  Dermot Hayes/Andrew Schmitz 
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Fig. 3.1  E.C. Import levies as percentage of export subsidies (1974- 
1984) 
Table 3.1  Import Levies Collected and Export Subsidies Paid by  the 
European Community, 1974-1984 (million of  European 
currency units) 


































prices. For the commodities listed, the protection rates in the EC were, 
with only one exception, significantly higher even than Japan’s. This, 
however,  is not the sole source of the problem.  In figure 3.2  wheat 
support prices in West Germany, France, and the United  States are 
shown. These prices,  which represent the minimum amount eligible 
farmers could expect to receive at harvest, increased to a similar degree 
on both sides of  the Atlantic.  In  1973 and 1974 actual  wheat  prices 71  US-EC Agricultural Policies 
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Table 3.2  Nominal and Effective Rates of Protection for Processed 
Agricultural Commodities in the European Community, Japan, 
and United States in the mid-1970s (percentage by value). 
EC  Japan  U.S. 
Nominal  Effective  Nominal  Effective  Nominal  Effective 
Meat products 






Flour and cereal 
preparations 
Soybean oil 
33  165  18  69  6  10 
45  75  19  49  15  37 
59  276  35  175  12  35 
77  1.328  45  418  10  47 
22  82  26  69  4  0 
49  95  24  75  11  35 
148  148  25  268  23  253 
Source: A. J. Yeats, “Agricultural Protectionism: An Analysis of Its International Eco- 
nomic Effects and Options for Institutional Reform,”  Trade and Devebprnent, no.  3 
( 1981 ). 
dThe nominal rate is the percentage by which the domestic product price exceeds the 
world price. The effective rate is the percentage by which protected value added exceeds 
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received in the U.S. were higher in dollar terms than the average of 
those received in the community. 
Figure 3.3 shows the wheat yields per harvested hectare in some of 
the main  producing  countries. Some enlightening comparisons  con- 
cerning the effect of the CAP can be made. In the late 1950s when the 
Community was formed, yields in  the United  States were about 70 
percent of those achieved in France. By 1982, after the CAP had been 
in operation for several years, this figure had fallen to 40 percent. In 
addition, wheat yields in  the U.K. showed only a moderate increase 
up to 1973; they had been surpassed for the first time ever by those in 
France in  the previous year.  After the U.K. joined the EC in  1973, 
these relative trends were reversed, with British yields increasing faster 
than those of the French. 
This postmembership performance cannot all be explained by rela- 
tive prices, however (figure 3.3). This is borne out by the behavior of 
yields in the United States. If movements along the supply curve were 
responsible for all of the increase in European yields, a more marked 
increase in American yields could have been expected in response to 
high prices in 1973 and 1974. It is obvious from these figures that certain 
aspects of the structural design of the CAP act to shift out the supply 
curve. There are two possible reasons for this. First, there is no down- 
side price  risk for commodities that  come under the CAP.  Sandmo 
(1971) has shown that when output prices are volatile, planned output 
u  .- 
L  c 
1965  1970  1975  1980  1983 
Year 
Fig. 3.3  Wheat yield per harvested hectare for various countries 73  US-EC Agricultural Policies 
decreases because risk-averse producers defer investments and avoid 
yield-increasing technologies  to reduce  input costs and exposure to 
risk. In the United States prior to the 1985 Farm Bill, this was the case 
as it still is in Australia and Canada. Prices in these countries depend 
on volatile world market conditions. 
Before  1985 American farmers could purchase downside price pro- 
tection by removing 20 percent of  their wheat base from production. 
By doing so, however, they exposed themselves further to changes in 
world prices via the opportunity cost of this unused land when market 
prices rose above costs of production. Until recently only a minority 
of U.S. producers (about 30 percent) chose this option. 
The method of agricultural  price-support funding in the EC is the 
second potential cause of  the outward shift in the EC supply curve of 
agricultural products. Individual European governments are aware that 
they receive the full benefits of output-increasing research, while bear- 
ing  only a proportion  of  the  costs involved  in  disposing  of  excess 
production.  This may  be  one of  the reasons  why  national  research 
expenditures  have increased  substantially in  recent  years (see table 
3.3). National  public expenditure  in favor of agriculture actually in- 
creased in the late  1970s despite a plan for shifting toward common 
funding (table 3.4). 
It is a commonly expressed sentiment in the Community that the 
solution to excess production is a return to  “more  market-oriented 
prices” (Commission of the European Community 1985a). The inelastic 
demand curve for food items ensures, however, that most individual 
producers could not survive at these prices, as the equilibrium revenues 
would be even lower than they were prior to the CAP. 
3.2.2 
Any attempt to measure the price elasticity of  supply in agriculture 
is faced by many problems that preclude accurate measurement. Farm- 
ers take many years to respond to aggregate price changes. While it 
may be possible to estimate a quantity response caused by producers 
switching between enterprises, to estimate the elasticity of supply when 
all prices are simultaneously increased to levels above equilibrium is 
much more difficult. On balance, higher prices encourage the devel- 
opment and adoption of output-increasing technologies. However, the 
mastery by producers of the more complicated methods of production 
requires a considerable learning period. At the same time the stabili- 
zation of agricultural prices in the EC encourages agricultural producers 
to move outward on their marginal cost curves, i.e., adopt higher-cost 
methods  of  production.  Separating the  effects of  these two factors 
operating on supply is  impossible, consequently, in  figure 3.4, it  is 
assumed that the supply-increasing effects of  stabilized  prices  is in- 
cluded in the overall price index. 
Long-Run Supply Response in Agriculture Table 3.3  National Public Expenditure in Favor of Agriculture, 1975-1980 
(million European currency units) 
West  The  European 
Ger-  Nether-  Luxem-  United  Ire-  Den-  Economic 
Year  manya  France  Italy  landsa  Belgium  bourg  Kingdom  land  mark  Community 
1975  1,589.4  2,241.0  2,595.9  200.5  101.3  14.4  1,493.7  176.7  134.0  8,546.9 
1976  1,513.4  2,770.6  1,810.5  236.3  115.6  21.9  1,206.1  215.1  158.2  8.047.7 
1977  1,568.2  2,950.5  1,942.4  258.5  144.9  28.9  931.9  239.2  177.1  8,241.6 
1978  1,670.5  2,239.7  2,067.1  288.5  197.5  16.3  685.9  297.3  224.7  7,687.7 
1979  1,670.4  2,515.4  2,164.8  307.5  236.2  18.5  855.4  281.3  277.2  8,326.7 
1980  1,636.5  2,731.6  2,882.2  330.0  229.7  9  1.075.5  360.9  273.9  9,520.3c 
Source: Commission of the European Community, Perspectives for  the Common Agricultural Policy: The Green Paper of 
the Commission. Brussels: Agricultural Information Service of the Directorate-General, July 1985. 
alncludes basic research but excludes Social Security expenses for farmers. These were of the order of 17 billion European 
currency units in  1980, i.e.,  143 percent of the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund expenditure of  175 
percent of the national expenditure in favor of agriculture. 
bNo data available. 
CLuxembourg  not included. Table 3.4  European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund Expenditure, 1975-1980 
(million European currency units) 
West 
Ger- 
Year  many 
1975  649.9 
1976  929.9 
1977  1,315.7 
1978  2,441.2 
1979  2,464.9 










Italy  lands 
961.3  543.9 
1,091.2  771.0 
1,000.  I  907.2 
1,195.9  1,111.2 
1,694.8  1,402.3 
1,930.0  1,569.7 
Luxem- 
Belgium  bourg 
187.1  6.0 
348.3  8.5 
435.2  10.2 
574.5  25.3 
769.7  13.9 
596.4  12.6 
United  Ire- 
Kingdom  land 
631.9  246.7 
511.7  234.4 
416.9  602.5 
1,193.9  358.1 
992.6  484.2 


















Source: Commission of  the European Community, European  Agricultural  Guidance and Guarantee Fund: Annual Report, 
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Long-run marginal cost curve for agriculture 
Consider an attempt to estimate the response of all producers to a 
general fall in the price level, if  the agricultural  sector is initially in 
disequilibrium. At initial price and output levels, Po and Qo in figure 
3.4, producers have not yet  adopted all  of the intensive production 
methods to produce the desired output Q*,. If we now lower the price 
level to PI,  consider the effect on output. Individual producers realize 
that their revenue has dropped from Po x  Qo to P, x  Qo and are en- 
couraged to become more efficient.  One way  to do this is to move 
more quickly to the optimum point on the marginal cost curve. This 
new point, Q*,, is greater than the amount currently being produced. 
The incentive, therefore, is to increase the rate of adoption of output- 
increasing technologies  until the new equilibrium has been reached. 
Any measurement of the price elasticity of supply at this point would 
be negative, i.e.,  lower prices, higher output. 
Within  the Community,  there is an enormous divergence between 
the yields that national research institutions claim to be economic and 77  US-EC Agricultural Policies 
those that are being achieved by the average farmer. If one defines the 
relevant region for a supply curve as the level of output that can be 
financed without changes in  the system, despite the fixed amount of 
land available, the long-run supply curve is flat. Therefore, any attempt 
to maintain prices above a market-determined equilibrium are destined 
to fail. The reason for this prediction is shown in the following back- 
to-back diagrams. 
3.2.3  Theoretical Considerations 
In figure 3.5, the short-run welfare implication of  maintaining spec- 
ified  internal price  levels  is  compared  with  that  of  free trade.  The 
internal EC market is modeled in the right-hand side of the diagram. 
The EC demand curve is D, and S is the corresponding supply curve. 
On the left-hand side of  the diagram the rest of the world is modeled. 
In the absence of any trade barriers the EC demand would be kn, or 
S 
World  EC 
Non-EC supply 
Non-EC  demand  for p*<  ps 
EC  consumers’  loss = abcd 
EC  producers’  gain  = aefd 
Tariff  revenue = ebij 
EC  gains/losses  = hgij  -  (ehf  + bcg) 
Non-EC consumers’  gain = ndlo 
Non-EC  producers’  loss =  kdlm 
Non-EC losses =  knom 
Fig. 3.5  Short run: Welfare comparison, free trade vs. EC support 
(Ps)  with variable levy 78  Dermot HayedAndrew Schmitz 
equivalently fc, the free trade price would be P,-.  In order to achieve 
a posttariff  internal price the EC must cut its imports to eb, or mo. 
This reduces the world price to P*. The magnitude of the tariff imposed 
on foreign imports in order to make the domestic support price effective 
is t. The net welfare effect from the tariff is hgij - (ehf + bcg), which 
can be positive or negative depending on the elasticities of supply and 
demand in both markets. 
It is interesting to observe how, in the long run, this policy can create 
a situation that yields a net loss to the EC. This is, in part, due to the 
dynamics of  supply response. The EC supply curve in figure 3.5  is 
assumed to be of a short run nature. In the long run, this supply curve 
becomes more elastic. As the supply curve flattens, the EC moves from 
being a net importer until it eventually becomes a net exporter. This 
is  illustrated in  figure 3.6.  At a constant support price, P,,  the EC 
becomes an exporter of the amount ab, given that it must impose a 
production quota constraint of jc or OQ* in order to contain export 
subsidies within its spending limits. (Notice that without this restriction 
the export subsidies required become infinite). On the world market 
the effect of these subsidized  EC exports is to drive prices down to 
P*. 
Successive increases in the amount that EC producers are willing to 
supply at P, have two effects: (1) they increase the amount that must 
be exported, and (2) they increase the export subsidy that must be paid 
as these subsidized exports drive down world prices. 
There is no long-run equilibrium solution to this situation. We  have 
indicated this by imposing an output restriction at OQ*. Unless gov- 
ernments in  other producing  countries intervene, their domestic in- 
dustry will be eliminated. Again, this occurs because of a flattening of 
the EC supply curve. As the diagram is drawn, the most efficient foreign 
producers are unwilling to operate if prices consistently remain below 
1. The net welfare loss in the EC is large, as is the net gain in the rest 
of the world. The EC subsidy is abcd. The loss to consumers is gafh 
while the gain to producers is gbreh. Thus, the net loss to the EC from 
protection is ofe  + adcro. 
It is interesting to observe how many of  the once major EC import 
goods have followed the pattern suggested in figures 3.5 and 3.6. The 
evidence suggests that when a country enters the EC, output expands 
rapidly (e.g., in the United Kingdom in figures 3.3 and 3.7). Also, the 
dynamics illustrated in figures 3.5 and 3.6 predict that, over time, the 
variable levies collected by the EC should diminish while the export 
subsidies should increase. This is occurring, as shown in figure 3.1. In 
1977, EC import levies as a percentage of export subsidies were roughly 
70 percent; by  1984 the percentage had decreased to under 30 percent 
by  1984. I  EC 
EC  consumers’  loss = gafh 
EC  producers’ gain  = gbreh 
Cost  of  export  subsidies abcd  -  spending 
Net gain  = -adcro-  ofe-=O 
ROW  consumers’  gain=  ihjk 
ROW  producers’ loss = mhl  (no  production) 
ROW  net gain  = ihjk-  mhl 
Fig. 3.6  Medium term: Welfare comparison, free trade vs. price support at Ps 80  Dermot HayedAndrew Schmitz 
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Fig. 3.7  Milk yield per cow (1955/1959-1983) 
3.2.4  Other Aspects of the Performance of the CAP 
A recently published Green Paper of the Commission of the European 
Community (1985a) entitled Perspectives for the Common Agricultural 
Policy outlines the performance of EC agricultural policy, the environ- 
ment in which it operates, and the problems it must overcome in the 
near future. The Green Paper creates a framework for a dialogue with 
Community institutions and professional organizations in order to de- 
fine the future prospects for European agriculture. It lays out the “rules 
of the game” that proposed adjustments to the CAP should follow. The 
purpose of these adjustments is to allow the policy to continue into the 
next  century. The Green Paper states: “The  Common Agricultural 
Policy has sustained the developments of community agriculture over 
more than twenty years, with results that are substantial and positive.” 
The principles we will use to evaluate the performance of the EC’s 
agricultural policies are those specified in the Treaty of Rome in 1957, 
those set forth at  the conference at Stresa in 1958, and a general concept 
of economic “fairness.”  The five agricultural objectives of the Treaty 
of Rome are set forth in appendix A. Three of the targets specified are: 
(1)  to optimize utilization of factors of production, (2) to stabilize mar- 
kets, and (3) to ensure that supplies reach consumers at reasonable 
prices. We  believe that the current policies  have not achieved these 81  US-EC Agricultural Policies 
three objectives, but we agree with the Commission’s evaluation that 
the other two targets specified in the Treaty of Rome have been met. 
3.2.5 
In table 3.5, data on the gross fixed capital formation per unit of 
gross value added for agriculture and for all sectors in the economies 
of the EC are presented.  With the exception of  Belgium in  1973, ag- 
riculture attracted a greater share of the annual available capital pool 
in all countries than did the economy as a whole. This investment bore 
no relation to market forces, however. It promoted a high investment 
rate in an industry with worldwide excess capacity. This capital inflow 
to agriculture and away from the rest of the economy affects the in- 
dustries that most need capital-high  technology and growth industries, 
thereby  reducing their comparative advantage and the adoption and 
development of  new technology. 
The Community has supported farm prices through an invisible tax 
on food consumption. Its target prices are generally above the world 
level, thereby violating the third target specified. High food costs must 
result in either increases in wage demands to maintain living standards 
or lower real  wages.  In industries where the first occurs, the Com- 
munity undermines its competitive base, since firms must charge more 
to pay high wage demands. Many of the Community’s industrial com- 
petitors can afford to pay lower wages because they import subsidized 
agricultural  products  from the EC.  In  addition, these countries  can 
shift factors out of agriculture and into export industries with the knowl- 
edge  that  the Community  will  subsidize  exports in  ever increasing 
quantities until adjustments are made to current policy. 
Industries in which the effect of  high food prices is especially un- 
favorable are those that are intensive users of human capital and operate 
in  free nonunionized  markets. Their workforce labor tends to be not 
only highly skilled but highly mobile.  Consequently, the decrease in 
real  wages resulting from increasing real food prices  within the EC 
provides an incentive for this labor to emigrate. High-technology com- 
panies in the United States have access to these skills without the cost 
burden required to produce them. 
Production quotas are already being used for milk and sugar, and 
forms of supply restriction are under consideration for cereals (Com- 
mission of  the European Community  1985a, 25). We  have previously 
shown that some form of  output restriction is the inevitable  conse- 
quence of  current policies. These restrictions can only have negative 
consequences for resource utilization. They freeze production among 
certain producers and within certain areas, and the process whereby 
innovative producers force out the inefficient is stopped. It is partic- 
ularly  harmful  when  applied  to  the  less-developed  areas  of  the 
Optimum Utilization of Factors of Production Table 3.5  Investment Rate in Agriculture and the Total Economy, 1973, 1980, and 1983 (percent) 
West  The  United 
Ger-  Nether-  Bel-  Luxem-  King-  Ire-  Den-  European 
Indicator  many  France  Italy  lands  gium  bourg  dom  land  mark  Communitya 






24.6  17.9  16.2  23.2  17.1  29.7  28.9  24.1  30.5  20.2 
31.6  21.4  22.0  32.7  21.6  33.7  26.7  30.4  30.1  24.9 
-  22.3  25.3  21.8  21.9  22.0  17.7  -C  23.7  - 
1973  17.4  17.7  15.3  17.6  17.5  19.1  15.9  19.8  15.8  16.9 
1980  17.5  16.5  14.3  15.6  16.2  18.2  15.0  23.4  14.6  16.1 
1983  15.5  -  12.6  13.7  15.1  -  13.5  -  -  - 
Source: Statistical Office of  the European Communities, Eurostat, various issues. 
"Includes West Germany, France, Italy, The Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, United Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark. 
bGross fixed-capital formation per unit of  gross value added, current prices, and exchange rates. 
CA  dash indicates no data available. 83  US-EC Agricultural Policies 
Community which are, in effect, stopped from developing if their com- 
parative advantage happens to be in a product the output of which is 
controlled. The exclusion of certain activities from EC support deters 
producers from entering these product lines. Given the choice between 
a product with output price guaranteed despite the absence of markets, 
and a nonsupported activity, which might prove viable in the long run 
even at world prices, producers will be biased toward the supported 
enterprise. Commodities that may have development potential but have 
been  neglected  include certain types of  nuts and fruit, fish, lumber, 
cotton, protein, and oil crops. 
One final comment should be made concerning the efficient use of 
resources. A series of budgetary crises has created uncertainty about 
the continuation of  present commodity programs. This, coupled with 
the on/off nature of the intervention process, has pushed human re- 
sources into predicting the outcome of  EC policy discussions rather 
than those of market forces. 
3.2.6  Stabilizing Markets 
The performance of  the CAP in achieving the second objective of 
the Treaty of Rome-that  of stabilizing markets-can be seen in figure 
3 of the Commissions’ Green Paper. From the statistics presented there, 
it can be seen that, relative to the unstabilized portion of the economies, 
agricultural incomes have been extremely volatile in recent years. When 
output prices are allowed to move freely, there is an inbuilt income 
stabilizer in operation. Uncontrolled  prices move in the opposite di- 
rection to yields in years of above- or below-normal harvests. 
3.2.7 
Many of the targets of  the Treaty of Rome were repeated as objec- 
tives of  the Council of Stresa (appendix B). In  addition, the treaty 
specifies that (1) balance should be sought between production and the 
possibility for outlets, (2)  account should be taken of the specialization 
appropriate to economic structures and natural conditions of the Com- 
munity, (3) the effort should allow the application of a price policy that 
avoids excess production and allows agriculture to become competi- 
tive, and (4)  a greater industrialization of the rural regions should allow 
a gradual solution to the problems otherwise passed over by marginal 
farms. 
There is little evidence of any attempt to balance production with 
markets. High internal  prices  encourage production  and discourage 
consumption. Attempts to alleviate this imbalance in agricultural mar- 
kets absorb more than half of  European Agricultural Guarantee and 
Guidance Fund spending (table 3.6). The price-guarantee policy has 
absorbed most of the money that might have been used to improve the 
Objectives of  the Council of  Stresa Table 3.6  Expenditure for Agricultural Market Organization in the European Community, 1973-1984* 
European Community (9)b  European Community 
1973  1974  1975  1976  1977  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984 
Own resources (billion 
European currency units)d 
Annual growth rate (percent) 
Expenditure for  agriculture 
market organization (billion 
European currency units)e 
Annual growth rate (percent) 
Total expenditure (percent) 
Share of individual commodities 
in expenditure  for  agricultural 














9.2  10.1 
11.1  10.2 
3.1  4.5 
-21.2  45.9 
72.6  75.2 
40.7  26.5 
10.4  20.5 
12.4  13.0 
3.4  6.0 



























































































~  ~ 
"For 1973-1982,  actual expenditure: for 1983-84,  payment appropriations as of July 22, 1983. 
bIncludes West Germany, France, Italy, The Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, The United Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark. 
CIncludes  the countries listed in footnote b plus Greece. 
%xludes  1 percent VAT,  1973- 1977 estimate. 
'Before  deducting revenue from the co-responsibility levy on milk. 
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economic base in rural areas. The longer such policies continue, the 
greater will  be the divergence between internal  agricultural  markets 
and those of the rest of the world. 
3.2.8  Fairness 
It is perhaps in the area of fairness that the performance of the CAP 
has been weakest.  The policy has excluded some commodities, dis- 
allowed part-time farmers from the structural improvement scheme, 
and based price increases on lobbying activity and political consider- 
ations. In areas where the price policy has operated, the main bene- 
ficiaries have been landowners as opposed to those who work the land. 
Faced with high output prices, farmers bid up input prices rather than 
absorb the surplus themselves (Johnson 1984). Land, being the fixed 
factor, has absorbed most of the benefits accruing from the policy. High 
land prices, in turn, deter new entrants and allow large landholders to 
use their holdings as collateral for further purchases. In the long run, 
output prices and income from farming become independent. 
The CAP has mainly increased the wealth of those who own the 
scarce resources, i.e., land and capital, not the labor and management 
that use these resources. This wealth transfer has been financed by 
high food costs that hurt the poor proportionately  more than other 
groups. In a sense, therefore, the entire system is regressive. It avoids 
Treasury exposure, thereby shifting the burden of  price support away 
from  progressive  income  taxes  and  toward  regressive  taxes  on 
consumption. 
3.3  U.S. Agricultural Policy and US-EC Trade Relations 
3.3.1  U.S. Behavior 
The provisions of  the CAP described above all conform to the rules 
for agricultural products contained in the GATT. They are legal because 
the United States demanded that exceptions be made from the basic 
GATT rules for primary products, especially for agricultural commod- 
ities. Specifically, there is a general derogation permitting export sub- 
sidies on primary products. In 1958 the U.S. was the leader in rejecting 
calls for a prohibition on these subsidies. The U.S. still possesses a 
“temporary waiver” granted over 30 years ago, while the EC does not. 
The EC obtained the right to support internal prices by consolidating 
its import duties on other products. 
The U.S. dairy industry is supported by policies that bear remarkable 
similarities to the CAP (Petit 1985). Not surprisingly, the dairy problem 
in the two trading blocs developed along similar lines. Figure 3.7, which 
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current U.S. yields are above those in Europe. The U.S. has its own 
cheese “mountain” and in 1983 lost more than a billion dollars in dairy 
price support programs. The emphasis in the U.S. dairy industry is on 
yield-increasing technology. A hormone recently developed promises 
to increase yields per cow by up to 40 percent. As in the EC, political 
lobbying ensures that neither the dairy supports nor the even more 
illogical tobacco and sugar quotas are changed. 
For wheat, corn, and soybeans, however, the United States has until 
recently adopted a relatively free-market philosophy. In the paper by 
Sarris in this volume (see his table 4.1), the producer subsidy equiv- 
alents for the United States and the EC are presented. For wheat, corn, 
and rice the U.S. subsidies are dwarfed by those of  the CAP prior to 
the crop year 1983-84.  In the face of falling market shares and financial 
problems among producers, however, the U.S.  has recently  adopted 
new policies toward these products that, from a European perspective, 
are dramatically different from those of the past. 
3.3.2  The 1985 Farm Bill 
For grains, traditional U.S. policy has been to offer producers price 
supports to encourage them to set aside a certain proportion of their 
base  acreage.  At  harvest,  program  farmers  could  borrow from  the 
government, using their stored grains as collateral. The amount bor- 
rowed per bushel depended on the loan rate, which reflected expected 
market prices. If  actual prices then rose above this rate the producer/ 
storer could sell the grain and repay the loan. If  not, he defaulted on 
the loan and the government became a storer. The producer received 
an additional deficiency payment that was set as the difference between 
a target price and the amount he received for his grain. The essential 
provision of this policy was that loan rates were set at the minimum 
that market prices were expected to be. Membership in the programs 
was large enough to ensure that the loan rate acted as a price floor for 
producers in the United States and in other exporting countries. If the 
EC wished to export wheat, it had only to offer an export  subsidy 
slightly below this rate. The U.S., therefore, acted as a residual supplier. 
The 1985 farm bill changed this. Loan rates have been cut by the 
maximum allowable under law (20 percent) and will now be set at 75- 
85 percent of the market price in previous years. Target prices remain 
unchanged; hence, the incentive for producers to  join the program has 
risen. Participation rates are expected to increase to 85 percent in 1988- 
89 (Womack et al.  1986). In addition, there is an optional provision 
that if  world prices fall below the loan rate, producers would repay 
only 70 percent  of  the loan.  Hence, if  world prices were  above 70 
percent of the loan rate but less than 100 percent, producers would not 
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The act contains a specific set of provisons to expand market share. 
For markets where U.S. products compete with export subsidies, $325 
million dollars have been allocated to counter this practice with a fur- 
ther $2 billion allocated to expand markets. This support will probably 
be in the form of the commodity itself (payment-in-kind), again reducing 
government stocks. It is interesting to note that the United States is 
attempting to reduce its stocks while those in the EC are expected to 
increase. 
A further $5 billion has been made available for short-term export 
credit guarantees and an additional  $1  billion dollars per year for in- 
termediate credit. A barter program to exchange agricultural products 
for strategic commodities has also been initiated. The PL480 program 
has been revitalized with 150,000 tons of dairy products and 500,000 
tons of grain and oilseeds. For meat promotion, at least 15  percent of 
the total  value  of  the payment-in-kind  export commodities must be 
poultry, beef, pork, or meat products. 
3.3.3 
In effect, the U.S. has changed its policies so that its prices are below 
those of its competitors. In addition, the government is attempting to 
reduce its stocks. In years when worldwide yields are high or when 
demand is low, there is no limit to how far world prices can fall. The 
export subsidies of the EC are set to be  just below those of the United 
States, which in turn are set just below those of its competitors. It is 
estimated that wheat prices will fall an additional 25 percent (Womack 
et al. 1986). 
3.3.4  Long-Run Implications 
As the target and loan prices diverge, all producers will eventually 
enter the program.  Once they respond to target prices, which will be 
above those on world  markets, they will  no longer face price  risk. 
When this occurs yields may well follow the pattern set in Europe. 
The Food Security Act of  1985 has provisions for removing from 
production a large proportion of the total land area, but in other respects 
it  is  similar to the policies  that have  caused  surplus production in 
Europe. With most producers responding to target prices, which are 
known in advance, equilibrium market prices will become irrelevant. 
The long-run outcome of such a policy  is similar to that outlined in 
figure 3.6  with more and more output being exported. In fact, provisions 
for production controls are contained in the bill to limit  the cost of 
export subsidies. 
When producers are guaranteed output-price supports for specific 
commodities, they lose all incentive to develop outlets for their pro- 
duction. It is difficult to imagine the hundreds of varieties of European 
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cheeses being developed had these producers received a milk price 
support. The governments of the EC-10 and the U.S. have, in effect, 
taken over this marketing work for the commodities they support. The 
fact that both  are major  exporters of unprocessed agricultural com- 
modities bears witness to the failure of their efforts. 
3.4  The Current Price War  and Its Future Direction 
3.4.1  The Impact of the Current Price War on 
Economic Performance 
Consumers in Europe are effectively  insulated from world  market 
prices.  U.S. consumers pay the equivalent of world prices but most 
bear the tax burden when these prices are below the cost of production. 
Johnson (1984) analyzes the source of growth in grain exports during 
the seventies: “The centrally planned economies accounted for almost 
half of the world import growth. . . . The next most important source 
of growth was the middle-income developing countries (Korea, Brazil, 
and Mexico). The low-developing countries had almost no net increase 
in grain imports during the period.”  He concludes that Japan and the 
Capital Surplus Oil Exporters were the only wealthy countries with 
major increases in food imports. 
It is commonly believed that, because expenditures on food are low 
in  developed  countries, economic performance  and food prices  are 
unrelated in the sense that a country can tax food consumption heavily 
without altering its comparative  advantage. The fallacy of this argument 
was demonstrated when OPEC increased  the price of oil, which ac- 
counted for a smaller percentage of expenditure than food. Comparing 
prices in rural areas with those in cities provides a second rebuttal to 
the argument. When rents are high,  everybody must be paid  more. 
This has the effect of increasing the cost of living by much more than 
one would expect from the share allocated to rent. Perhaps the most 
significant refutation to the argument can be found by comparing recent 
increases in GNP among countries that benefit  from subsidized food 
products and those that pay for these subsidies.* In this respect the 
Soviet Union has an optimal approach to agricultural production  in 
that it maintains food prices below equilibrium while encouraging sub- 
sidized imports. Though some Soviet officials bemoan  the country’s 
agricultural performance, the current party chairman was previously 
responsible for the agricultural sector and has not been unduly punished 
for its poor performance. 
The World Bank (Tyers and Anderson 1986) has recently estimated 
that trade liberalization in both developing and industrial market econ- 
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$18.3 billion gain for developing countries, and a loss of $23.1 billion 
for East European nonmarket economies. If only the industrial coun- 
tries liberalized, the respective figures would be $48.5, $1 1.8, and $1 1.1 
billion. 
3.4.2  The Future 
The most likely outcome of the current price war is the imposition 
of quotas on all agricultural commodities in both the United States and 
the EC. Such controls already exist in both communities (sugar, milk, 
and tobacco) and are mentioned in both the Green Paper and the 1985 
Farm Bill. This outcome is undesirable for a number of reasons. It is 
forbidden under the Treaty of Rome by the provisions dealing with the 
efficient use of resources. Inputs taken out of production in a restricted 
commodity will end up in other enterprises making them the subject 
of new controls; for instance, land freed up by the dairy quota can now 
be used for grain production. In figure 3.6 it can be seen that quotas 
provide a benefit or rent to their owner (the area gbrs). The owners 
then form an effective lobby against changes. The eventual beneficiaries 
are not the currently efficient producers of the product but those who 
were the  most  efficient producers at the time  the  restrictions  were 
imposed. An examination of the U.S. tobacco industry makes it clear 
that these are two very separate groups. It is important therefore that 
some alternative is found before lobbying groups are formed. 
A possible solution is that the governments of both countries simply 
transfer wealth to producers in the form of  direct income payments. 
This approach is very difficult to implement. Producers themselves are 
against this overt form of charity, since it would lead to large budget 
outlays. A precise definition of a farmer is also difficult to determine. 
It is likely that many small hobby farmers or retirees would take ad- 
vantage of  such a program. 
3.5  To  Ease the Tensions 
3.5.1  An Alternative 
It is now politically infeasible to lower prices to their new equilibrium 
level, yet as long as market prices are above that level, the problem 
outlined in figure 3.6 will  arise. There is, however, another alternative 
that avoids the problem outlined above. It is a policy that could be 
used as the basis for a bilateral alignment of the policies of both coun- 
tries in the next round of GATT. 
The adjustments we propose can reduce the net welfare loss of EC 
policy. They are stable in the long run and obey the rules of the game 
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of the CAP outlined above. We  feel that the inherent instability of the 
present  system will eventually make adjustments similar to the ones 
we propose optimal. Implicit in the proposed set of adjustments is the 
assumption that EC governments have a mandate to support employ- 
ment in agriculture. This involves assisting uneconomic units to slow 
their movement out of the industry, thereby maintaining the rural fabric 
and avoiding the enormous units that the free market seems to dictate. 
Alternatively,  this proposed policy could be  used  as the basis for a 
bilateral alignment of the agricultural policies in both areas. The current 
price war is the result of the domestic policies of both the United States 
and  the  EC, and the  situation cannot be  resolved  unless these  are 
changed first. Trade negotiators must deal with the cause of  the food 
surplus rather than attempting to dispose of this surplus. 
3.5.2  The Proposed Adjustments 
The proposal consists of the following: 
1. Select a farm size (in terms of gross input) that the EC would most 
like to support. The choice of this unit has structural implications in 
that the proposed policy would favor this farm size over and above all 
others. It should be at or below the present Community average. 
2. Collect data on costs of production for the target farm size, using 
efficient technology for all commodities. 
3. Announce the proposed policy adjustments, making it clear that 
only farms enrolled in a modernization plan will be eligible. The design 
of the structural plan should be altered to admit all producers regardless 
of off-farm employment, income level, or commodity produced. 
4. Each year specify either a total finance cap for the community or 
a  maximum  reference  income per  producer  up  to which  there  is  a 
mandate to support agricultural incomes. It is important for the political 
feasibility of  the proposal that individual countries be allowed to in- 
crease this reference level from national finances. The fair choice of 
such a total finance cap can be estimated once producers have had time 
to adjust their output, by estimating the following price and quantity 
vectors for the Community: 
where 
P = price vector of all commodities produced in the Community, 
Q = quantity vector of all commodities produced in the Community, 
N  = current prices and quantities, 
p  = world prices and the quantities that would be produced in  the 
Community if the proposals were implemented, i.e., if world mar- 
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and 
C = average cost of producing  each of these commodities, as de- 
termined by the level of inputs which, in turn, depends on market 
prices. 
The difference between the two parts of the equation in braces is 
the financial burden that should be borne by taxpayers to make pro- 
ducers, in  the aggregate,  indifferent  between the proposed and the 
current policies. Initially, needed estimates of consumer benefits could 
be obtained from a model  such as that developed by Thomson and 
Harvey (1981). 
5. Measure actual market prices Pp,  in each area. 
6. Each year estimate the quantities of output, Q*, that the target 
farm size in  each region would  produce given prevailing  prices and 
weather conditions. 
7. Estimate the target price, PT,  for each commodity from the equation 
(1)  (PT - C*)Q* =  reference income, 
where C*  refers to the average cost that an efficient producer of  Q* 
would incur. 
8. Estimate the per unit producer subsidy, S, for each commodity 
from the equation 
9. All production should be sold at whatever price the market will 
yield,  P,.  Producers should  receive a  check at the end of the year 
estimated by measuring their agricultural sales, Q. The maximum al- 
lowable amount of the producer’s output that will be subsidized, Q, 
should be such that 
(3)  SQ  + (P, - C*) Q 5  reference income. 
10. Producers of several commodities, should choose the commodity 
on  which  they  want to earn the producer’s subsidy.  If  many  such 
producers choose a particular commodity, the target price, PT,  and, 
therefore, S, for that commodity should be revised downward. If pro- 
ducers ask for more than one commodity to be included, estimate 
(4) 
N 
CPL  Q* ST~S~  Q  + (PL - C)  Q I  reference income. 
i=  I 
3.5.3  The Welfare Effects 
To  see how these proposals would influence the income position and 
incentives of producers, consider figure 3.8. The three marginal-cost 
curves represent small, medium, and large producers of the commodity. 92  Dermot HayedAndrew Schmitz 
Reference income = abcd 
Average  cost  of  a  hypothetical producer 
to produce  Q'  = C'(Q') 
Fig. 3.8  Price incentive facing producers by farm size 
The small producers receive P, for all their output. This encourages 
them to expand output to Q1  by adopting a more intensive enterprise 
or by intensifying their present one. The medium and large producers 
are guaranteed the reference income, abcd, plus whatever they earn 
from producing beyond Q*. 
All producers have an incentive to increase the price they receive 
for their output, which they could do by marketing or differentiating 
their product. The EC would estimate P,, at a national or Community 
level. Producers could increase their income by marketing  their pro- 
duce so as to earn a price greater than p,,. Producers would have an 
incentive to reduce costs below those used to estimate C(Q*).  Those 
who produce Q* at a higher average cost would be penalized. The EC 
would  mail  the small producer a check for ahfg, and the other two 
would receive at least abcd either via their actual profits or from the 
EC. Notice that if the price P,, of this commodity is well above its cost 
of production, large producers would require no  government payments. 
They would earn the reference income without government assistance. 
Since most output now comes from large  farmers, the largest  per- 
centage of output would then be produced in response to world prices. 
In figure 3.9, the present situation and proposed schemes are com- 
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EC should the proposals be adopted. The abolition of export subsidies 
increases world prices from PG  to P;  while saving the EC the amount 
abcd. It shows the decrease in EC output in this commodity from Q, 
to Q2 because (1) producers can now try other enterprises, such as 
lumber production, since they will obtain a certain minimum income; 
(2) at the margin, producers face increased price risk and lower prices 
so they are less likely to adopt output-increasing technologies that are 
uneconomic at world prices; and (3) they have an incentive to reduce 
costs by experimenting with low-cost production methods. 
There is a large net gain in welfare within the Community. Consumers 
gain gajh; producers as a group lose  the area gbeh  but  receive  an 
amount equal to this surplus (see adjustment no. 4). In addition, small 
producers gain rents due to the additional output they produce when- 
ever PT is their marginal price. The EC treasury gains abcd but must 
pay gbeh so that producers as a group are indifferent. There is a welfare 
gain within the Community equal to the shaded area plus the area ofe. 
Large landowners will lose the rents that have accrued since EC mem- 
bership.  This will  be mitigated  by  the guaranteed minimum  income 
available from farming. In addition, they avoid the inevitable output 
restrictions. These farmers could be helped by nationally financed in- 
terest subsidies on preexisting loans. The EC holds no intervention 
stocks and saves the associated storage costs. Production  will occur 
in areas where Europe has a competitive advantage at world  market 
prices. 
In the rest  of the world,  producers gain lhjm and consumers lose 
ihjk. Countries that export the commodity will gain and therefore face 
less pressure to support their own producers. Countries  that import 
the commodity will have higher food costs and will lose some of their 
present comparative advantage in manufacturing (for a quantification 
of these areas, see Stoeckel 1985). 
The owners to quota rights in the EC will lose gbrs (figure 3.6). It 
is important that some change is made in the present system before 
the rents accruing to quotas give rise to lobbying efforts to maintain 
them. Demand in the EC is stimulated by  lower food prices and in- 
creased marketing efforts by producers. The situation is stable at the 
new equilibrium. 
In 1980, the total EAGGF expenditure (table 3.4) was 11,909.3 million 
European currency units  (MECU). For  the same year,  it  has been 
estimated by Thomson and Harvey (198 1) that the total loss in producer 
income  that would  occur if  there were full  movement to free trade 
would have been 19,144 MECU. They have also estimated (p. 68) that 
a complete move to free markets would initially involve a 30 percent 
fall in agricultural prices and this would be passed on to consumers. 
The difference  between current EAGGF expenditures and the esti- 
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this gain in consumer surplus. This policy does not result in an income 
transfer. Producers would receive support only for output they pro- 
duce. Inefficient producers could still lose if their costs are above those 
of the results achieved on the target or model farm. 
Johnson (1984) presents a review of studies on the effect of EC trade 
liberalization on prices. For wheat the price rise was 9.6 percent (Koes- 
ter 1982), 15 percent (Schiff 1983), and 20 percent (Anderson and Tyers 
1983). These figures should be compared with the 25  percent fall in 
prices expected by Womack et al. (1986), based on the provisions of 
the 1985 Food Security Act. 
In the long run, it should be possible for producers to reduce this 
loss in income by adopting low-cost technologies and marketing their 
products to achieve a premium over world market prices. The proposed 
adjustments would increase the incomes of  small producers, thereby 
allowing national governments to reduce the social security expenses 
of these producers.  In 1980, these totaled 16,600 MECU. If  this total 
were  cut by  less than  5 percent,  no increase  in  taxation  would  be 
necessary to finance the changes. 
Since 1984 the situation has deteriorated. The present decline in the 
value of the dollar coupled with the inherent increase in export sub- 
sidies makes it  inevitable that the proposed adjustments must some 
day be  implemented  to lower  EC-Treasury exposure. Current price 
supports pass the producer surplus on to the owners of the fixed re- 
source-principally  land. Under the proposed scheme, benefits would 
flow directly to those who work the land, i.e., the rents would accrue 
to labor and management which would then be the fixed factor. People 
who farm large acreages would therefore gain, benefiting from econ- 
omies of scale as well as the guaranteed income they would earn. They 
would lose from lower land values. The adjustment costs to free-trade 
prices at the margin could be lessened by specifying in advance the 
yearly reductions in current support prices. This adjustment could take 
several years to complete. The absentee farmers in the United Kingdom 
would lobby against the adjustment but the country would gain from 
lower consumer prices and the comparative advantage its more efficient 
units would have at free-trade prices. This might justify additional U.K. 
expenditures to increase the target farm size for its producers. Such 
national  adjustments  should be allowed. They would not  inhibit the 
free movement of agricultural products between Community members. 
3.6  Conclusions 
Fixing output prices  by  means of  export  subsidies or giveaways, 
import levies or quotas, intervention buying or government storage, is 
not a feasible long-term solution to the problems facing the agricultural 
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By removing the price risk and attempting to maintain prices above 
equilibrium these policies encourage producers to adopt intensive high 
cost technologies  in enterprises where the EC does not have a com- 
parative advantage or a potential market. 
The Ricardian rents that accrue cause land prices to rise, increasing 
the wealth of landowners as opposed to farm income. The system is 
regressive  in that it transfers wealth from consumers to landowners 
via income taxes or invisible taxes on food. 
The inevitable surpluses such programs generate have driven world 
prices down. This causes havoc in food-exporting countries, encour- 
aging their producers to seek similar support. In addition, low world 
food prices artificially increase the magnitude of the export subsidies 
needed to dispose of this surplus. 
Major food importers are among the beneficiaries of these distor- 
tions. The centrally planned economies, Japan, and upper-income de- 
veloping countries serve to benefit from the price war between Europe 
and the United  States, which  has just begun.  Relative  prices have 
shifted  in  a  manner that promotes an expansion of  the agricultural 
industries in  Europe and the U.S. at the expense of  industries that 
have viable markets. This situation is reversed for countries that com- 
pete with Europe and the U.S. in industrial products. 
It seems inevitable under present policies that quotas will eventually 
be used for most agricultural  products on both continents. Once in 
place, these quotas will be impossible to eliminate. They will not in- 
crease the income of farmers but rather that of those who own the 
quota rights. Consumers in both communities will be saddled with an 
inefficient and expensive food supply. 
We  have proposed an alternative to the present policy that would 
help alleviate the world oversupply situation in agriculture and reduce 
costs. It shifts the emphasis of producers from output-increasing tech- 
nology to cost reduction and output-price enhancement. It would en- 
courage producers to adopt high-risk enterprises rather than high-risk 
technologies in low-risk enterprises. If at the end of the year medium 
or large producers found they had made no profit from farming, they 
would still be assured of receiving a certain minimum income from the 
government. Consumers would benefit as would small farmers. World- 
wide, the United States, Canada, and other exporters would gain, but 
importers would lose due to rising world agricultural prices. 
However, there would be losers if the proposed policy were enacted; 
these would generally be nonfarming owners of large farms. 
In conclusion, the increase in agricultural output in the EC since the 
early 1970s has been astronomical and unsurpassed by any of the tra- 
ditional  agricultural  exporters including  the  United  States. This in- 
crease in output that is, in large part, due to the CAP, has played havoc 97  US-EC Agricultural  Policies 
with the world markets. The United States has responded with a similar 
program of  its own. In the ensuing price war both  parties will  lose 
significantly. The final solution will be some form of output restriction 
on both sides of the Atlantic or along the lines proposed in this study. 
Appendix A 
Excerpts from the Treaty of  Rome 







To  increase agricultural productivity by promoting technical prog- 
ress and by ensuring the rational development of agricultural pro- 
duction and the optimum utilization of the factors of production, in 
particular, labor. 
To ensure a fair standard of  living for the agricultural community, 
in particular, by  increasing the individual earnings of persons en- 
gaged in agriculture. 
To stabilize markets. 
To  assure the availability of  supplies. 
To ensure that supplies reach consumers at reasonable prices. 
Appendix B 
Recommendation from the Council of  Stresa 
A close correlation should be established between the policy for adapt- 
ing structures and the policy for markets. Structural adaptation should 
help to bring about a convergence of costs of production and a rational 
orientation of production. Market policy should be conducted so as to 
encourage the improvement of productivity. A balance should be sought 
between production and the possibilities for outlets, taking account of 
the exports and imports which can be made, and of the specialization 
appropriate to the economic structures and natural conditions of the 
Community. The effort thus made to increase productivity should allow 
the application of  a price  policy  that avoids  excess production  and 
allows agriculture to remain or become competitive. 
The improvement of agricultural structures should allow the capital 
and labor employed in  European agriculture to attain or maintain  a 98  Dermot HayedAndrew Schmitz 
level of remuneration comparable with what they would receive in other 
sectors of the economy. Given the importance of  the family structure 
in European agriculture and the unanimous desire to preserve its family 
character, every means should be imployed [sic]  to increase the eco- 
nomic and competitive capacity of family farms. Professional retraining 
of the agricultural workforce and greater industrialization of the rural 
regions should allow a gradual solution to  the problems otherwise posed 
by marginal farms which cannot become economically viable. 
Notes 
I. The cost per bushel of producing corn, wheat, and soybeans, based on a 
5-year average yield is 2.70, 3.78, and 6.12 respectively (Sullivan and Wilson 
1986). The 22 August 1986 futures prices for these commodities are 1.60 for 
corn, delivery in December 1986; 2.35 for wheat, delivery in July 1987; and 
4.93 for soybeans, delivery in November 1987. Recent work by Stanton (1986) 
indicates that European costs for corn and wheat are at least as high as those 
quoted above. 
2. A recent study (Stoeckel 1985) indicates that the expansion of agriculture 
and deindustrialization of the community caused by the CAP could have cost 
the community one million jobs. 
References 
Anderson, Kym, and Rodney Tyers. 1983. European Community’s grain and 
wheat policies and U.S. retaliations: Effects on international prices, trade 
and welfare. Unpublished paper, Department of Economics, Research School 
of Pacific Studies, Australian National  University, Canberra. 
Commission of  the European Community. Various years. European Agricul- 
tural Guidance and Guarantee Fund: Annual report. 
-.  1985a. Perspectives for the Common Agricultural  Policy: The Green 
Paper of the Commission, July. Brussels: Agricultural  Information Service 
of the Directorate-General. 
-.  1985b. The new agricultural structures policy. Newsletter of  the Com- 
mon Agricultural  Policy, no. 21 1. 
-.  1985~.  Commission memorandum on the adjustment of  the market 
organization for cereals. Com (85) 700, 14 November, Brussels. 
Johnson, D.  Gale. 1984. World grain trade beyond 2000. Paper presented at 
the Centennial Forum of the International Wheat Council, 28-29  June, Ot- 
tawa, Canada. 
Koester, Ulrich. 1982. Policy options for the grain economy of  the European 
Community: Implications for developing countries. Washington, D.C.:  In- 
ternational  Food  Policy  Research  Institute.  Research  Report  no.  35 
(November). 99  US-EC Agricultural Policies 
Meilke, Karl, and Harry de Gorter. 1985. An econometric model of the Eu- 
ropean Economic Community wheat sector. Discussion Paper no. 85/1 (Jan- 
uary), School of Agricultural  Economics and Extension Education, University 
of Guelph, Ontario. 
Petit, Michael. 1985. Determinants of agriculture policies in the United States 
and the European Community. International Food Policy Research Institute 
Research Report no. 51 (November). 
Rosson, C. Parr 111.  1985. Agricultural trade policy under scrutiny: An over- 
view. Cooperative Extension Service, The University of  Maryland. Agri- 
cultural Trade no.  1. 
Sampson, G. P., and R. H. Snape. 1980. Effects of the EEC’s variable import 
levies. Journal ofPolitical Economy 88 (October): 1026-40. 
Sandmo, A. 1971. On the theory of the competitive  firm under price uncertainty. 
American Economic Review 61. 
Schmidt, Erich.  1984. European Community agricultural  policy  and trade: 
Current developments and prospects. In World Agricultural Policy and Trade, 
ed.  G. E.  Lee.  Proceedings of  a  conference  held  at the  University  of 
Saskatchewan. 
Schiff, Maurice. 1983. Information, expectations, and policies: A study of the 
world wheat market. Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago. 
Stanton, B. F.  1986. Production costs for cereals in the European Community: 
Comparisons with  the United  States 1977-1984.  A.E.  Res 86-2.  Cornell 
University Agricultural Experiment Station, Ithaca, New York. 
Statistical Office of the European Communities, various issues. Eurostat. 
Stoeckel, A. 1985. lntersectoral effects of growth, trade, and unemployment. 
BAE Occasional Paper no. 95. Australian Government Publishing Service, 
Canberra. 
Stucker, Barbara C., and Keith J. Collins.  1986. The Food Security Act of 
1985: Major provisions affecting commodities. National Economics Division, 
Economic Research Service, U.S.  Department of Agriculture Information 
Bulletin no. 497. 
Sullivan, Gene D., and W.  Gene Wilson. 1986. Farm financial implications of 
crop production costs. Paper presented at  the meeting of the Federal Reserve 
System Committee on Agriculture  and  Rural  Development, 31  July,  San 
Francisco. 
Thomson, K. J., and D.  R.  Harvey.  1981. The efficiency of  the Common 
Agricultural Policy. European Review ofAgricultura1 Economics, 8. 
Tyers, Rodney, and Kym Anderson. 1986. Distortions in world food markets: 
A quantitative assessment. Background paper for the World  Development 
Report 1986. New York: Oxford University Press. Published for the World 
Bank. 
U.S.  Department of Agriculture. Various years. Agricultural Service. 
U.S.  Department of Agriculture.  1986. Oilseeds and Products. Foreign Agri- 
cultural Service (February). Washington, D.C. 
Womack, Abner W., Robert E. Young 11, William H. Meyers, and S. R. John- 
son. 1986. An analysis of the Food Security Act of 1985. FAPRI Staff Report 
# 1-86 (February), Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa. This Page Intentionally Left Blank